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THE “ELEMENT” OF SURPRISE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT BUCKS THE
FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT TREND IN
ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. v. CHINA MINMETALS CORP.
DANIEL WOTHERSPOON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Parties injured by worldwide anticompetitive conduct have long pre-
ferred to litigate their claims in the United States.1  This is because the
United States has some of the harshest antitrust laws in the world.2  To
police and regulate this influx of foreign-born litigation, Congress passed
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) in 1982 to clarify
the extraterritorial reach of the existing antitrust statute, the Sherman
Act.3  Since its inception, courts have largely viewed FTAIA as a jurisdic-
tional limitation on the Sherman Act.4  Under this view, FTAIA limits the
ability of the U.S. federal courts to hear and resolve certain antitrust cases
involving extraterritorial conduct.5
Beginning in the early 1990s, however, a minority view developed that
questioned the jurisdictional view and proposed that the FTAIA is instead
a substantive restriction on the Sherman Act.6  Under this view, FTAIA is
not a limitation on the courts’ ability to hear cases, but is instead an ele-
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law.  This Casebrief
reflects the state of the law as of May 2012. The author would like to thank the
editorial staff of the Villanova Law Review for their invaluable comments and
advice.  This Article would not exist but for the unwavering love and support of the
author’s family and Jennifer Robert.
1. See S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, the FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects:
Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 805, 805 (2006) (discussing extraterritorial reach of Sherman Act).
2. See id. (noting that “[t]he United States has the most developed and aggres-
sive antitrust regime in the world”).
3. See Evan Malloy, Comment, Closing the Antitrust Door on Foreign Injuries: U.S.
Jurisdiction over Foreign Antitrust Injuries in the Wake of Empagran, 38 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 395, 396 (2006) (stating that FTAIA was enacted to clarify extraterritorial
reach of U.S. antitrust law).  For a further discussion of FTAIA, see infra notes
41–68 and accompanying text.
4. See Edward Valdespino, Note, Shifting Viewpoints: The Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act, a Substantive or Jurisdictional Approach, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 457, 457
(2009) (noting subtle shift from jurisdictional to substantive view).  For a further
discussion of the jurisdictional view of FTAIA, see infra notes 41–56 and accompa-
nying text.
5. See Valdespino, supra note 4, at 464 (discussing difference between jurisdic-
tional grants and substantive causes of action).
6. For a further discussion of the substantive view of FTAIA, see infra notes
57–68 and accompanying text.
(785)
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ment of the plaintiff’s cause of action.7  Although some Supreme Court
justices and circuit court judges supported the substantive view, it was not
fully embraced by a circuit court until 2011.8  In Animal Science Products,
Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp.,9 the Third Circuit held that the FTAIA ex-
ceptions are properly viewed as an element of a foreign antitrust claim as
opposed to a limitation on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.10
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit’s decision to break from
prior precedent in its interpretation of FTAIA and analyzes the decision’s
potential impact on foreign antitrust litigation.11  Part II, which follows
this Introduction, traces the development of FTAIA from its origins in de-
termining the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act through the way it
has been shaped by the federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court.12
Part II also addresses Supreme Court precedent that directly impacted the
Third Circuit’s decision in Animal Science Products.13  Part III discusses the
Third Circuit’s opinion in Animal Science Products.14  Part IV analyzes the
decision’s potential impact on foreign antitrust suits within the Third Cir-
cuit, including both the procedural impact and pertinent policy considera-
tions.15  Part IV also offers advice to practitioners handling foreign
antitrust cases in the Third Circuit.16  Finally, Part V concludes that other
circuits will likely embrace, or be forced to embrace, the Third Circuit’s
view of FTAIA and discusses the potential implications for foreign entities
conducting business in the United States.17
7. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469
(3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]n enacting FTAIA, Congress exercised its Commerce Clause
authority to delineate the elements of a successful antitrust claim . . . .”).
8. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813–14 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing distinction between legislative and judicial juris-
diction); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 964 (7th Cir.
2003) (Wood, J., dissenting) (“FTAIA adds an element to an antitrust claim . . . .”).
9. 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
10. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision and rationale in
Animal Science Products, see infra notes 101–22 and accompanying text.
11. For an analysis of the Third Circuit’s decision in Animal Science Products,
see infra notes 123–58 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the state of foreign antitrust law before FTAIA and the
way the circuits shaped FTAIA application, see infra notes 18–40 and accompany-
ing text.
13. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp. and the Court’s creation of the “clearly states” rule, see infra notes 69–81 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s opinion in Animal Science Products,
see infra notes 96–122 and accompanying text.
15. For an analysis of the impact of the Third Circuit’s decision on foreign
antitrust litigation and the policy implications behind it, see infra notes 126–58
and accompanying text.
16. For suggestions to Third Circuit practitioners, see infra notes 159–68 and
accompanying text.
17. For a concluding discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of FTAIA and
the implications for foreign business within the United States, see infra notes
169–172 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 with the primary
goal of protecting American consumers by prohibiting monopolies and
restraints of trade.18  The Sherman Act provides that “every contract, com-
bination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is hereby declared to be
illegal” and a felony offense.19  While Congress attempted to provide a
useful guide for the development of antitrust law, courts and commenta-
tors have long criticized the Sherman Act for being overly broad.20  In
addition to its failure to specify who can bring suit, the Sherman Act does
not even describe the type of conduct that gives rise to antitrust claims.21
A. Origins of FTAIA
The Sherman Act’s generality and lack of guidance became a major
issue in the early twentieth century as the United States became more eco-
nomically involved with foreign countries.22  Although section 2 of the
18. See Deborah J. Buswell, Note, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: A
Three Ring Circus—Three Circuits, Three Interpretations, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 984
(2003) (describing purpose of Sherman Act).
19. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
20. See Note, A Most Private Remedy: Foreign Party Suits and the U.S. Antitrust
Laws, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2122, 2126 (2001) (stating that Sherman Act is “remarka-
bly general in its proscriptions” and noting that some have criticized the Act as
“little more than a legislative command that the judiciary develop a common law
of antitrust.”) (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES, at 4 (5th ed. 1997)).
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (failing to provide specific guidance for application
of act).  Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provide:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corpo-
ration, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Id.
22. See Chris Norton, United States Changing Foreign Policy, NEWSFLAVOR (Feb.
27, 2010), http://newsflavor.com/politics/international-relations/united-states-
changing-foreign-policy/ (“Early 20th century United States tended to depart from
their prior form of expansionism in favor of one that looked to the world’s
wealth.”); see also Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420,
423–24 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he history of this body of case law is confus-
ing and unsettled”).
3
Wotherspoon: The "Element" of Surprise: The Third Circuit Bucks the Foreign Tr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-4\VLR406.txt unknown Seq: 4  5-DEC-12 12:09
788 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 785
Sherman Act mentions “trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations,” the
statute does not address whether foreign or domestic plaintiffs can sue
under the statute or what type of foreign conduct or effects implicate the
statute.23  Therefore, the federal courts have had to interpret the extrater-
ritorial reach of the Sherman Act—and they have disagreed about the is-
sue since the earliest applications of the statute.24
1. Shedding the Isolationist View of the Sherman Act
Judicial uncertainty and confusion have marked the analysis of the
Sherman Act’s applicability to foreign conduct since the Supreme Court
first applied the statute in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.25 in
1909.26  In American Banana, a domestic defendant monopolized the ba-
nana trade to the detriment of a domestic plaintiff.27  Taking into account
issues of sovereignty and international comity, the Court declined to ex-
tend the reach of the Sherman Act to the defendant’s actions abroad.28
Over time, however, the Court slowly began to expand the Sherman Act’s
extraterritorial reach.29
In 1927, the Court reversed course from American Banana in United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,30 which held that in some instances, the Sherman
Act extends to conduct outside of the United States.31  The Sisal Court
stepped beyond prior precedent by applying the Sherman Act to a foreign
defendant whose domestic conduct was incidental to a conspiracy.32  Al-
though the defendant was charged with obtaining a sisal monopoly in
Mexico through actions taken within Mexico, the Court held that the ef-
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (providing little guidance about foreign application of
act).
24. See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 423 (noting that federal courts have long dis-
agreed about extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust laws).
25. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
26. See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 275–78
(Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2006) (detailing early FTAIA precedent).
27. See id. at 275 (describing facts of case).
28. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlaw-
ful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”).
29. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) (holding that cartel
formed outside United States but whose actions had effect on U.S. commerce was
subject to Sherman Act); United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228
U.S. 87, 98–99 (1913) (holding that Sherman Act reaches foreign citizens and cor-
porations operating in U.S. territory); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 132–34 (1911) (holding that Sherman Act applies against foreign defendants
where conspiracy also involved domestic defendants and threatened United States
economy).
30. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
31. See id. at 275 (distinguishing case from American Banana and noting that
American Banana rationale is not applicable).
32. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 277–78 (“[A]ny planning or
conduct by the defendant within the United States was hardly crucial to its Mexi-
can monopoly obtained by the acts within Mexico.”).
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fect on United States commerce was sufficient to trigger liability under the
Sherman Act.33
While the Sisal decision slightly expanded the Sherman Act’s reach, it
did not change the lower courts’ analysis of the Sherman Act in any mean-
ingful way.34  Most of the antitrust cases in the early twentieth century con-
tinued to focus on domestic conduct and domestic effects—there
remained no clear standard for determining the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Sherman Act.35  Courts were largely content to analogize their
facts to or distinguish them from American Banana until 1945 when the
Second Circuit settled on a test in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(Alcoa).36
2. The Second Circuit Tries to Provide Guidance: The Alcoa Effects Test
In Alcoa, the Second Circuit sought to provide a clear standard for the
level of domestic effect that was required to implicate the Sherman Act.37
The court held that the defendant, a Canadian corporation, violated the
Sherman Act by conspiring with European aluminum producers to refuse
to sell aluminum in the United States.38  Articulating its test, the Second
Circuit stated that foreign conduct falls within the Sherman Act if it is
“intended to affect imports and did affect them.”39  Although the test
made clear that courts should focus their analysis on the location of the
effects and not the conduct, courts have found the test difficult to apply
and consequently some circuits have refused to fully accept it.40
33. See Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 275 (1927) (distinguishing case from Ameri-
can Banana because all conduct had occurred within United States and holding
that Sherman Act applied).
34. See id. at 276 (“The United States complain of a violation of their laws
within their own territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not merely of
something done by another government at the instigation of private parties.”).
35. For cases that focused on domestic effects and conduct, see supra note 29.
36. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
37. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259, 261–62 (1960) (describing necessity of determining
extraterritoriality of Sherman Act); see also Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and
American Business Abroad Today, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251, 1260 (1995) (noting that
“[t]he antitrust horizon had been permanently altered by the jurisdictional aspects
of the Alcoa decision in 1945”).
38. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422–24 (detailing facts of case).
39. Id. at 444.  Judge Learned Hand expounded on the effects test by holding
that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders . . . .” Id.
at 443.
40. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d
Cir. 1981) (modifying effects test to make it narrower); Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614–15 (9th Cir. 1976) (creating tripartite test where
“effects test” is only one factor to consider); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 F.
Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (doing away with determining extent of effects and
instead simply determining whether effect was deleterious), decision supplemented,
115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.
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B. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Congress’s “Inelegant”
Language Leads Courts Astray
To clarify the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act and cut back
on the large number of cases brought by foreign parties involving only
minor effects on domestic commerce, Congress passed the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.41  FTAIA’s first aim was to clarify that
the Sherman Act’s focus is to protect American consumers and exporters,
not foreign consumers or producers.42  FTAIA’s second goal was to clarify
the level of effect on United States commerce that is sufficient to implicate
the Sherman Act.43
To that end, FTAIA states that foreign conduct will generally not im-
plicate the Sherman Act unless an exception applies.44  The first FTAIA
exception provides that the Sherman Act covers foreign conduct involving
Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (describing requisite effect on United States
commerce as “direct and influencing”), modified by Timken Roller Bearing Co v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
41. See JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 7:4 (Thomson/West 2d ed. 2006) (noting that situa-
tions where “challenged conduct produced no appreciable effects on U.S. com-
merce” are “uncontroversial” under FTAIA); see also Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).  The FTAIA provides:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to con-
duct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import
commerce) with foreign nations unless—(1) such conduct has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—(A) on trade or com-
merce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import
trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or(B) on export trade or
export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade
or commerce in the United States; and (2) such effect gives rise to a claim
under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of
the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall
apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United
States.
Id.
42. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 287 (describing legislative in-
tent behind FTAIA); see also 15 U.S.C. § 6a (stating that trade and commerce with
foreign nations shall not implicate Sherman Act unless it is import trade and
commerce).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (providing that foreign conduct must have “direct, sub-
stantial and reasonably foreseeable effect[s]” on United States commerce); see also
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993) (“The FTAIA
was intended to exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions that did not
injure the United States economy . . . .”).
44. See An Overseas Sea Change for U.S. Antitrust Laws?  New Developments in the
Interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, CLIENT ALERT (Proskauer
Rose L.L.P., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 7, 2011, available at http://www.proskauer.
com/publications/client-alert/an-overseas-sea-change-for-us-antitrust-laws/ (not-
ing that one of FTAIA’s biggest departures from Alcoa effects test is elimination of
intent requirement); see also Richard J. Link, Construction and Application of Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 483, § 2
(2005) (noting that FTAIA initially places all “nonimport activity involving foreign
6
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“import trade or import commerce.”45  Under the second exception, the
Sherman Act also applies to foreign conduct that “has a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States commerce.46
1. Missing the Forest for the Trees: The Prevailing Analysis of FTAIA
Although the purposes of FTAIA are to clarify the extraterritorial
reach of the Sherman Act and to provide guidance to courts addressing
foreign antitrust issues, the “inelegant” language of the statute has led to
more confusion than clarity.47  Over the past thirty years, courts have
predominantly interpreted FTAIA as jurisdictional, requiring foreign con-
duct claims to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless
the international anticompetitive conduct falls within the “import trade or
commerce” or “effects” exceptions.48  Yet that is where the consensus
ends; due to FTAIA’s ambiguity, courts have largely disagreed on how to
interpret the language of its exceptions.49
commerce” outside reach of Sherman Act, and then brings such conduct back
within Sherman Act through two exceptions).
45. See Link, supra note 44, at § 2 (describing “import trade or commerce”
exception as threshold issue under FTAIA).  For a further discussion about how
courts have interpreted this exception, see infra notes 47–56 and accompanying
text.
46. See Link, supra note 44, at §2 (discussing FTAIA’s clarification of Sherman
Act’s extraterritorial reach).  Much of the litigation surrounding FTAIA has fo-
cused on interpreting and applying this exception. See Max Huffman, A Retrospec-
tive on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L.
REV. 285, 315 (2007) (describing litigation concerning effects test and noting “in-
terpretive problems”).  In 2004, the Supreme Court eventually settled the issue
holding that the plaintiff’s claim must arise from the anticompetitive conduct’s
effect on United States commerce. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173 (2004) (discussing required effect of conduct).
47. See Buswell, supra note 18, at 984 (noting that FTAIA “[m]udd[ied] the
waters further”); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 288 (referring to
FTAIA’s language as “cumbersome, ambiguous, and inelegant”).
48. See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 344
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing “precise issue presented” as whether FTAIA autho-
rizes subject matter jurisdiction), vacated, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Filetech S.A. v.
France Telecom S.A., 304 F.3d 180, 181 (2d Cir. 2002) (agreeing with district court
that plaintiff failed to establish that court had subject matter jurisdiction over for-
eign defendant); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l P.L.C., 284 F.3d 384, 401 (2d Cir. 2002)
(applying FTAIA to hold that defendants cannot escape scrutiny for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction), abrogated by Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Den Norske Stats
Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
district court properly dismissed antitrust claim for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under FTAIA); Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 78
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that FTAIA is inapplicable and therefore court has subject
matter jurisdiction over case), overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable
& Wireless P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (employing FTAIA stan-
dards to determine whether court has subject matter jurisdiction).
49. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Empagran: What Next?, 58 SMU
L. REV. 1419, 1424–25 (2005) (discussing ways in which courts have tried to define
standards set by FTAIA exceptions); Jonathan T. Schmidt, Note, Keeping U.S. Courts
7
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The majority of FTAIA analysis and litigation has focused on inter-
preting the statute’s requirement that the conduct “gives rise to a claim”
and the impact of this language on the jurisdictional analysis.50  The de-
bate led to a split within the circuit courts spearheaded by the Fifth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit.51  The Fifth Circuit interpreted the “gives rise to a
claim” language to require that the foreign injury and domestic effect be
interrelated enough that a domestic plaintiff could have brought a Sher-
man Act suit.52  The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, held that the “effects
exception” applies even where the foreign injury is independent of the
domestic effect.53  After many years and much litigation, the Supreme
Court settled the issue in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.54 by
agreeing with the Fifth Circuit and holding that the domestic effect must
“give rise to” the plaintiff’s claim; it is not enough if the domestic effect is
independent of the foreign injury.55  Although there were extensive dis-
agreements over FTAIA, the circuits rarely addressed whether the statute
was jurisdictional or substantive—they simply presumed that it was
jurisdictional.56
Open to Foreign Antitrust Plaintiffs: A Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of Inter-
national Cartels, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 223–32 (2006) (describing differing ap-
proaches by circuits and Supreme Court).
50. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). See
Huffman, supra note 46, at 318 (“The requirement that a harm in domestic com-
merce ‘give[ ] rise to a claim’ has been the basis for extensive litigation at all levels
of the federal court system since at least the late 1990s, and has removed the pri-
mary interpretive issue under the FTAIA.”).
51. Compare Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 421 (holding that domestic effect of defen-
dant’s conduct must have caused particular injury at heart of suit), with Empagran,
315 F.3d at 350 (holding that there only needs to be possibility of claim by private
party in United States, thus allowing foreign plaintiffs to bring suits based on hypo-
thetical domestic plaintiffs).
52. See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428 (“In sum, we find that the plain language of
the FTAIA precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims by foreign plaintiffs
against defendants where the situs of the injury is overseas and that injury arises
from effects in a non-domestic market.”).
53. See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 350 (“We hold that, where the anticompetitive
conduct has the requisite effect on United States commerce, FTAIA permits suits
by foreign plaintiffs who are injured solely by that conduct’s effect on foreign
commerce.”).
54. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
55. See id. at 163 (holding that where “the price-fixing conduct significantly
and adversely affects both customers outside the United States and customers
within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any ad-
verse domestic effect . . . .  [T]he FTAIA exception does not apply (and thus the
Sherman Act does not apply)” to claims based solely on foreign effect).
56. See Valdespino, supra note 4, at 468 (noting, in 2009, that “all of the Cir-
cuits currently agree that the FTAIA should be interpreted as limiting a court’s
jurisdiction”).
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2. Challenging the Consensus: United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus
Chemical Co. Unearths the Substantive vs. Jurisdictional Debate
Despite criticism by the Supreme Court in the early 1990s, the juris-
dictional view of FTAIA continued to prevail largely without challenge.57
However, in United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co.,58 the Seventh
Circuit resolved to address the issue and determine whether FTAIA was
jurisdictional as courts had long held, or whether it was substantive and
therefore an element of the plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim.59  The case in-
volved a suit brought by an Indian chemical manufacturer and an Ameri-
can firm against an American chemical company for using anticompetitive
means to harm their business.60  The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss, contending that the court lacked subject matter juris-
diction under FTAIA.61  The district court granted the motion to dismiss,
and the plaintiffs appealed.62  In holding that the district court properly
treated the issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit
noted that no circuit had adopted the view that FTAIA is an element of a
Sherman Act claim.63
In dissent, Judge Wood criticized the jurisdictional view of FTAIA and
laid the groundwork for applying the substantive view of the statute in
subsequent cases.64  According to Judge Wood, the majority’s reliance on
circuit court decisions and agency publications was misplaced.65  In her
view, the court could resolve the issue simply by critically reading the stat-
57. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The second question—the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman
Act—has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts.  It is a question of sub-
stantive law turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted
regulatory power over the challenged conduct.”).
58. 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003).
59. See id. at 944 (“The primary issue involves whether the relevant provision
of FTAIA is jurisdictional or whether it states an additional element of a Sherman
Act claim.”).
60. See id. (describing facts of case).  Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant, upon learning that plaintiffs were going to acquire certain technology,
filed a frivolous lawsuit, which occupied plaintiffs’ time and resources and kept
them from acquiring the technology. See id. (same).
61. See id. at 944–45 (describing procedural posture of case).
62. See id. (agreeing with defendants that plaintiffs failed to allege that de-
fendants’ conduct had “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on
domestic commerce).
63. See id. at 950 (“But with reference to FTAIA, the argument that the statute
sets out an element of the claim or a basis for legislative jurisdiction has not gained
approval.”).
64. See Valdespino, supra note 4, at 480 (noting that Justice Wood “an-
ticipat[ed] this shift” from jurisdictional to substantive view); see also Animal Sci.
Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopt-
ing Justice Wood’s analysis of FTAIA issue and stating “the FTAIA’s limitations
should not rank as jurisdictional”).
65. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 953 (Wood, J., dissenting) (“But neither
the majority nor those earlier opinions have distinguished carefully between judi-
cial and legislative jurisdiction . . . .”).
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ute.66  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit previously specified that jurisdiction
rules must be stated clearly, yet the language of FTAIA does not refer to
jurisdiction.67  Judge Wood reasoned that FTAIA’s “shall not apply” lan-
guage should thus be construed as setting substantive limitations, not as
delineating the courts’ competency to hear a claim.68
C. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.: The Supreme Court “Clearly States” Its Views
on Jurisdictional Statutes
In 2006, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in Arbaugh v. Y
& H Corp.69 that closely followed Judge Wood’s reasoning in United Phos-
phorus.70  Although Arbaugh did not concern FTAIA, the Court’s decision
to adopt Wood’s reasoning set the stage for the circuit courts to rethink
their FTAIA jurisprudence.71  In Arbaugh, the Court faced the very same
issue concerning the distinction between jurisdiction-stripping statutes
and substantive, “elemental” statutes.72  The plaintiff brought a Title VII
action against her employer for sexual harassment.73  The defendant filed
66. See id. at 955 (Wood, J., dissenting) (reading FTAIA critically and stating
“[t]he fact that the FTAIA does not contain a clear congressional statement that it
is intended to restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts (or for
that matter even a brief mention of the term ‘jurisdiction’) should be enough to
resolve the question before us”).
67. See Czerkies v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1439 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“The circuits are in agreement: door-closing statutes do not, unless Congress ex-
pressly provides, close the door to constitutional claims, provided that the claim is
colorable and the claimant is seeking only a new hearing or other process rather
than a direct award of money by the district court.”); Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982) (lacking explicit language that refers to
jurisdictional limitation).
68. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 955 (Wood, J., dissenting) (“Language
like that of the FTAIA, stating that a law does not ‘apply’ in certain circumstances,
cannot be equated to language stating that the courts do not have the fundamen-
tal competence to consider defined categories of cases.”).
69. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
70. See Valdespino, supra note 4, at 480 (“This new rule seems to be almost
directly derived from Judge Wood’s dissent in United Phosphorus and one must
surely give her credit for anticipating this shift.”).
71. See id. at 482–83 (discussing future of FTAIA litigation in wake of Arbaugh
decision).  For a discussion of an FTAIA case applying the Arbaugh reasoning, see
infra notes 96–122 and accompanying text.
72. See Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extra-
territorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1097 (2010)
(noting that Arbaugh “address[ed] the issue of the propriety of labeling a dismissal
as jurisdictional”); Howard M. Ullman et al., Exposing Foreign Cos. to U.S. Antitrust
Litigation, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/3955.pdf
(stating that Supreme Court in Arbaugh distinguished between substantive limita-
tions and subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts).
73. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503–04 (detailing factual background of case).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to dis-
criminate against its employees on the basis of sex. See id. at 504 (same).  Title VII
defines employer as any person with fifteen or more employees. See id. at 504–05
(discussing definitions in Title VII).
10
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a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss asserting that it employed fewer than
fifteen employees and therefore could not be sued under Title VII.74  The
district court interpreted the fifteen-employee rule as a jurisdictional limi-
tation and dismissed the claim with prejudice.75
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court unanimously held
that the fifteen-employee requirement was not a jurisdictional matter; it
was a substantive aspect of the plaintiff’s Title VII claim.76  The Court be-
gan its reasoning by addressing the circuit courts’ “profligate” use of the
term “jurisdiction.”77  According to the Court, cases where a claim is dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without considering the “sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-a-claim-for-relief dichotomy” are
“‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no precedential
effect.’”78  The Court noted that while Congress does have the power to
make certain statutory elements “jurisdictional,” that power does not ex-
tend to the courts absent jurisdictional language in the statute.79  To clar-
ify the confusion, the Court created a “readily administrable bright line”
rule.80  The “clearly states” rule requires that courts interpret statutes that
lack jurisdictional language as non-jurisdictional in character.81
74. See id. at 508 (noting procedural posture of case).  The jury returned a
verdict for Arbaugh but, because 12(b)(1) motions cannot be waived, the defen-
dant was able to move to dismiss after the court entered judgment on the verdict.
See id. at 509 (same)
75. See id. at 504, 509 (noting district court recognized that granting motion
would cause waste of judicial resources, but that district court believed itself
obliged to dismiss).
76. See id. at 504 (“[Title VII’s] numerical threshold does not circumscribe
federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction.  Instead, the employee-numerosity re-
quirement relates to the substantive adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title VII claim, and
therefore could not be raised defensively late in the lawsuit . . . .”).
77. See id. at 510 (noting that Supreme Court has also been inconsistent when
determining whether statutes are jurisdictional).
78. Id. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91
(1998)).
79. See id. at 514–15 (describing Congress’s power to make statutes jurisdic-
tional); see also Reuveni, supra note 72, at 1098 (noting that Arbaugh Court rea-
soned that “a court’s power to adjudicate depends only on whether Congress or
the Constitution confers upon the courts the authority to adjudicate the underly-
ing dispute”).
80. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516.  The “clearly states” rule provides:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a stat-
ute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be
duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.  But when
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdic-
tional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in
character.
Id. at 515–16 (citations omitted).
81. See Jonathan M. Rich et al., Third Circuit Eases Burden on Foreign Injury Anti-
trust Plaintiffs, ANTITRUST LAWFLASH (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius L.L.P., Washington,
D.C.), Aug. 29, 2011, at 2, available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Anti
trust_LF_ThirdCircuitEasesBurdenonAntitrustPlaintiffs_29aug11.pdf (stating that
11
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D. The Third Circuit’s Pre-Arbaugh Approach to FTAIA
Until Arbaugh, the Third Circuit’s FTAIA jurisprudence fell in line
with that of the other circuits in interpreting FTAIA as a jurisdictional
statute.82  Despite recognizing the statute’s cumbersome and convoluted
language, the Third Circuit did not address the jurisdictional/substantive
issue in any of its FTAIA cases.83  The circuit first addressed FTAIA in the
2000 case Carpet Group International v. Oriental Rug Importers Association.84
In Carpet Group, the plaintiff brought suit against Oriental Rug Importers,
alleging that the defendants conspired to sabotage the plaintiff’s efforts to
facilitate sales between foreign manufacturers and United States retail-
ers.85  Before the district court and on appeal, the defendants objected to
the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction on FTAIA grounds.86  The district
court granted the defendant’s motion, but the Third Circuit reversed on
appeal.87  The reversal was not predicated upon the district court’s juris-
dictional view of FTAIA; it was predicated on its application of that view in
the particular case.88  The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff alleged suf-
ficient evidence to support the contention that the conduct fell within an
exception to FTAIA and therefore the statute did not limit the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.89
Employing a rationale similar to that in Carpet Group, the Third Cir-
cuit again addressed FTAIA in Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc.;90
Arbaugh held “that courts should regard statutory limitations as substantive unless
Congress specifically stated that they are jurisdictional”).
82. See id. at 1 (discussing Third Circuit’s FTAIA jurisprudence before Animal
Science Products).
83. See, e.g., Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir.
2002) (“In rather convoluted language, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act introduces two requirements . . . .”), overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v.
China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011); Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental
Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We first turn to the relevant
provisions of the ‘inelegantly phrased’ FTAIA.” (quoting United States v. Nippon
Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997))), overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc.
v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
84. 227 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2000), overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
85. See id. at 64 (describing allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint).
86. See id. (describing procedural posture of case).  The defendants asserted
that the plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants’ actions had a substantial effect
on United States commerce. See id. (same).
87. See id. at 78 (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction exists under the Sherman Act,
and . . . plaintiffs have antitrust standing.”).
88. See id. at 73 (“The crux of [plaintiffs’] case involves conduct in the United
States, not conduct abroad. . . .  [T]hese activities are not the type of conduct
Congress intended to remove from our antitrust jurisdiction when it enacted the
FTAIA.”).
89. See id. at 78 (“[T]he plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to demon-
strate that the activities of the wholesale importers were intended to and adversely
did impact on domestic commerce . . . .”).
90. 303 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2002), overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
12
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however, the court arrived at a different conclusion.91 Turicentro involved
a suit by Latin American and Caribbean travel agents alleging that an air-
line trade association had engaged in horizontal price fixing in violation
of the Sherman Act.92  The district court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, citing a complete lack of evidence that the de-
fendants’ conduct caused any injury to the United States economy.93  On
appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the issue was
one of subject matter jurisdiction.94  The Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that
the plaintiff failed to allege a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect” on United States commerce.95
III. ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. V. CHINA MINMETALS CORP.: THE
THIRD CIRCUIT EMBRACES THE ARBAUGH STANDARD
Many commentators viewed the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh
as hugely significant in shaping the way courts would interpret questiona-
ble jurisdictional statutes in the future.96  The “clearly states” rule was
straight forward, easily applicable and seemed to settle, at long last,
FTAIA’s substantive/jurisdictional issue.97  However, with regard to
91. See id. at 297–98, 308 (holding that District Court was correct in finding
that FTAIA deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction).
92. See id. at 296–97 (describing factual background of case).
93. See Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (E.D.
Pa. 2001) (“[A]ssuming as true that the alleged conspiracy and the actions taken in
furtherance thereof did occur within United States commerce, the plaintiffs aver
nothing from which this Court could find that Defendants’ purported conspiracy
caused any injury which was felt in the U.S. or which affected the American econ-
omy in any way.”), aff’d sub nom. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293
(3d Cir. 2002), overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654
F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
94. See Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 300 (“[T]he central issue on appeal is whether
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act bars subject matter jurisdiction in
this Sherman Antitrust case.  Therefore, our primary task is one of statutory
interpretation.”).
95. See id. at 307 (noting that “[p]laintiffs’ injuries occurred exclusively in
foreign markets[,]” and “[t]hey are not of the type Congress intended to prevent
through the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act or the Sherman Act”).
96. See, e.g., Stephen R. Brown, Hearing Congress’s Jurisdictional Speech: Giving
Meaning to the “Clearly-States” Test in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 46 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 33, 36–37 (2009) (describing Arbaugh as “jurisprudentially significant” and
noting that “the Arbaugh Court also cast doubt on the precedential value of any
previous holding”); Valdespino, supra note 4, at 482–83 (noting that question is
not “if” Arbaugh will bring about change in FTAIA jurisprudence, but “when”
change will occur and “what” it will mean).
97. Compare Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (describing
“clearly states” rule), with Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (failing to
use jurisdictional language).  FTAIA contains no jurisdictional language which
should rank it as non-jurisdictional under the “clearly states” test. See Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982) (lacking explicit lan-
guage that refers to jurisdictional limitation).
13
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FTAIA, Arbaugh has not caused a significant change within the circuits.98
Because Arbaugh was a Title VII case and did not address FTAIA directly, it
did not expressly overrule prior decisions.99  Of the few circuits presented
with FTAIA litigation post-Arbaugh, only the Third Circuit has utilized the
“clearly states” rule.100
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Animal Science Products involved a class action suit by two United States
corporations against several Chinese producers and exporters of magne-
site.101  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy
to fix the prices of the magnesite that they sold in the United States.102  As
a result of the conspiracy, the plaintiffs were forced to purchase the de-
fendants’ magnesite at supracompetitive prices.103  The plaintiffs further
98. See, e.g., Centerprise Int’l, Ltd. v. Micron Tech, Inc. (In re Dynamic Ran-
dom Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.), 546 F.3d 981, 985 n.3 (9th Cir.
2008) (noting that jurisdictional/substantive issue is unsettled but declining to ad-
dress it); Inquivosa SA v. Ajinomoto Co. (In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust
Litig.), 477 F.3d 535, 536 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
99. See John R. Foote & Blaire Z. Russell, A New Direction for the FTAIA: Recent
Interpretations May Expand the Foreign Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST NEWSL.
(NIXON PEABODY L.L.P., San Francisco, Cal.), Nov. 14, 2011, at 1–2, available at
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Antitrust_Alert_11_
14_2011.pdf (discussing impact of Arbaugh on FTAIA jurisprudence).
100. See Animal Sci. Prods. Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 468–69
(3d Cir. 2011) (discussing Arbaugh and applying “clearly states” rule).  Commenta-
tors have espoused several reasons for why Circuits have been unwilling to adopt
the “clearly states” test in their FTAIA jurisprudence. See, e.g., Foote & Russell,
supra note 99, at 2 (noting that Circuits may not want to change their settled juris-
prudence and may not feel obligated to do so by Arbaugh); Valdespino, supra note
4, at 482 (stating that there has been dearth of FTAIA cases since Arbaugh and
general reluctance of federal courts to make drastic changes).
101. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 464 (detailing facts of case before dis-
trict court).  Magnesite is the naturally occurring carbonate form of magnesium.
See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp.,
596 F. Supp. 2d 842, 851 (D.N.J. 2008) (describing magnesite).  Over eighty per-
cent of the world’s magnesite reserves are estimated to come from China. See id.
(same).  Magnesite is mined from magnesium deposits and delivered from the
mine to a crushing plant where it is crushed in three stages. See id. (same).
102. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 464 (describing plaintiff’s allegations).
The Department of Justice describes price-fixing as, “an agreement among com-
petitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or ser-
vices are sold.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation
Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For, ANTITRUST PRIMER, (U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 28, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/211578.pdf.  There are many forms of price-fixing, but any
agreement to restrict price competition is a violation of the Sherman Act. See id.
(describing price-fixing).
103. See Animal Sci. Prods., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (describing defendants’ al-
leged anticompetitive conduct).  The plaintiffs alleged that prices of magnesite in
their industry (animal feed) rose twenty-five percent as a result of the defendants’
collusive arrangements. See id. at 853 (discussing plaintiffs’ allegations).
14
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alleged that the price-fixing scheme impacted hundreds of millions of dol-
lars of United States commerce.104  Based on these allegations, the plain-
tiffs filed suit in federal court claiming that the defendants’ actions
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.105
Raising the subject matter jurisdiction issue sua sponte, the district
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice, citing
FTAIA.106  The plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint with evidence
supporting their allegations, but this time the defendants followed the
court’s example and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.107  In response, the district court examined whether either of the
FTAIA’s exceptions applied to the case.108  After extensive fact-finding,
the court determined that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to satisfy
either exception and again held that FTAIA deprived it of subject matter
jurisdiction.109
B. Third Circuit’s Reasoning
On appeal, the Third Circuit fundamentally disagreed with the dis-
trict court’s FTAIA analysis.110  The court held that FTAIA constitutes a
substantive limitation rather than a limitation on the court’s subject mat-
104. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 464 (describing plaintiff’s allegations).
105. See id. (explaining basis of plaintiffs’ suit).
106. See Michael B. Himmel & Jamie R. Gottlieb, Getting Out from Under Anti-
trust Litigation: How It Just Got Harder for Foreign Entities to Stay Out of the U.S. Antitrust
Labyrinth, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.lowenstein.com/
files/Publication/b7354e4e-4b19-4b33-af2d-8289df010763/Presentation/Publica-
tionAttachment/35124f3c-2663-49f5-be30-89721a9c8e06/Getting%20Out%20
From%20Under%20Antitrust%20Litigation.pdf (noting procedural background
of case).  The court instructed the plaintiffs that:
[I]n the event Plaintiffs file an amended complaint, Plaintiffs must
incorporate in their submission evidentiary proof allowing the Court to
conduct a factual determination (in contrast with the facial analysis con-
ducted herein) and to conclusively satisfy itself as to presence or lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
Animal Sci. Prods., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
107. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 464 (detailing procedural background
of case).  Though the complaint listed seventeen Chinese corporations as defend-
ants, only five remained defendants through the appeal. See id. (same).  These
corporations were grouped as either the China Minmetals defendants or the Sinos-
teel defendants, and are the parties that filed the motion to dismiss. See id. at
464–65 (same).
108. For a discussion of FTAIA’s exceptions, see supra notes 44–46 and ac-
companying text.
109. See Christopher Walsh, FTAIA Compliance in a Post-Twombly World,
LAW360 (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.gibbonslaw.com/UserFiles/Image/12356703
26.pdf (discussing court’s application of Twombly pleading standards in analyzing
plaintiffs’ complaint through FTAIA exceptions).
110. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 467–68 (“Understandably, the District
Court in this case adhered to [ ] precedent. . . .  [H]owever, we will now . . . hold
that the FTAIA constitutes a substantive merits limitation rather than a jurisdic-
tional limitation.”).
15
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ter jurisdiction.111  In so holding, the court vacated the district court’s de-
cision and overturned Turicentro and Carpet Group in one fell swoop.112
Relying heavily on the reasoning in Arbaugh, the Third Circuit examined
FTAIA’s statutory text for references to district court jurisdiction.113  The
court determined that the statute was “wholly silent” in regard to jurisdic-
tion and merely read that the Sherman Act “shall not apply” under certain
conditions.114
Applying Arbaugh’s “clearly states” rule, the Third Circuit reasoned
that FTAIA must be interpreted as a substantive limitation due to the ab-
sence of jurisdictional language.115  In interpreting FTAIA in this way, the
Third Circuit made it clear that, as an element of their claims for relief,
plaintiffs will need to demonstrate FTAIA’s inapplicability to their case by
showing that an exception applies.116  Consequently, the Third Circuit in-
structed the district court that, on remand, it could only consider a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.117
After reframing the issue, the Third Circuit provided the district court
with guidance concerning how to interpret the FTAIA question on re-
mand.118  Addressing the “import trade or commerce exception,” the
Third Circuit stated that the district court correctly reasoned that the ex-
ception must be given strict construction, but that it erred in defining that
standard.119  The exception does not require that the defendant be the
physical importer of the goods, as the district court held, but instead re-
quires that the defendant’s conduct “target import goods or services.”120
In regard to the “effects” exception, the Third Circuit criticized the district
111. See id. at 469 (holding that FTAIA is substantive)
112. See id. at 467–68 (overturning prior Third Circuit cases only as to juris-
dictional issue).
113. See id. at 468–69 (describing Supreme Court’s reasoning in Arbaugh).
114. See id. at 468; Ullman et al., supra note 72, at 2 (describing Third Cir-
cuit’s application of Arbaugh).
115. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 468–69 (“The FTAIA neither speaks in
jurisdictional terms nor refers in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”).
116. See id. at 470–71 (discussing exceptions to FTAIA); United Phosphorus,
Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 953–54 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, J., dissent-
ing) (noting difference between jurisdictional and “element” approach and defin-
ing element approach as acknowledgement that FTAIA criteria describe element
of plaintiff’s claim).
117. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 469 (“Unmoored from the question of
subject matter jurisdiction, the FTAIA becomes just one additional merits issue.”).
118. See id. at 470–71 (providing District Court with instructions for remand).
The Third Circuit made it clear, however, that, because FTAIA is merely an ele-
ment of the claim, the district court was under no obligation to settle the FTAIA
issue and was free to resolve the matter through other means. See id. at 469–70
(same).
119. See id. at 470 (disagreeing with district court’s analysis of FTAIA excep-
tions); see also Walsh, supra note 109, at 3 (“[T]he [district] court found that the
complaint failed to adequately allege that any of the defendants actually imported
magnesite in the United States.”).
120. Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 470.  The Third Circuit noted that while
evidence that defendants physically imported the goods into the United States may
16
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court for reading a “subjective intent” requirement into the statute.121  Ac-
cording to the Third Circuit, the inclusion of the “reasonably foreseeable”
language in the statute creates an objective standard such that the effect
on United States commerce must have been foreseeable to an objectively
reasonable person.122
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
It is unlikely that Animal Science Products will significantly change all
facets of foreign antitrust litigation in the Third Circuit.123  However, the
decision represents a significant change in the way the Third Circuit will
view FTAIA going forward.124  By embracing the substantive view of
FTAIA, the decision will have procedural and substantive effects on for-
eign antitrust litigation that will change the way practitioners approach the
resolution of these cases.125
A. Procedural Impact
Prior to Animal Science Products, defendants in foreign antitrust suits
invoked the protections of FTAIA by raising Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.126  Under the jurisdictional
interpretation of FTAIA, defendants could move to dismiss the case be-
cause the alleged foreign conduct did not fall within either exception and
therefore the court could not consider the claim.127  Defendants pre-
ferred this FTAIA interpretation because it allowed for cases to be dis-
satisfy the exception, it is not a necessary prerequisite as the district court had
held. See id. (clarifying FTAIA exception for District Court).
121. See id. at 471 (noting district court’s use of phrase “intent-to-affect”).
122. See Scott B. Murray & David L. Cook, Third Circuit Reverses Course on Juris-
diction for Sherman Act Claims Against Foreign Defendants, 205 N.J. L.J. 1, 2 (2011),
available at http://www.sillscummis.com/Repository/Files/2011_September_Mur-
ray_and_Cook.pdf (noting that it is unclear whether district court actually relied
on this reasoning, but that plaintiffs had questioned district court’s language).
123. See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 469–70 (noting that decision does not
compel district court to resolve FTAIA issue and that district court may choose to
decide case through other means).
124. For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s FTAIA jurisprudence prior
to Animal Science Products, see supra notes 82–95 and accompanying text.
125. See Cavanagh, supra note 49, at 1424–25 (noting that substantive view of
FTAIA brings with it procedural and substantive changes).
126. See, e.g., Centerprise Int’l, Ltd. v. Micron Tech, Inc. (In re Dynamic Ran-
dom Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.), 546 F.3d 981, 985 n.3 (9th Cir.
2008) (stating that defendants premised their motion to dismiss “solely on jurisdic-
tional grounds”); Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 64 (3d
Cir. 2000) (noting that defendants objected to court’s subject matter jurisdiction
on grounds that FTAIA barred plaintiffs’ claims), overruled by Animal Sci. Prods.,
Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
127. For examples of cases where defendants moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and courts discussed how FTAIA’s exceptions affect that
determination, see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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missed early and because 12(b)(1) motions heavily weigh in their favor.128
In a 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of convincing the
court that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.129  To do so, the
plaintiff must proffer evidence to satisfy this burden but is given neither
the benefit of a presumption nor an opportunity to gather this evidence
through discovery.130
Another detriment to the plaintiff that is inherent in the jurisdic-
tional view of FTAIA is the 12(b)(1) motion’s potential to strip plaintiffs of
their right to a jury.131  A 12(b)(1) motion goes to the court’s ability to
decide the case, a fact not subject to jury trial.132  Instead, the court en-
gages in jurisdictional fact-finding, which often takes place in protracted
preliminary hearings.133  While it may seem as though the trade-off for
burdening the plaintiff is preserving time and resources by dismissing
cases at the outset, the preliminary hearings often become trials in and of
themselves.134  In fact, in United Phosphorus, it took eight years, twenty-four
depositions, and over 8,000 pages of exhibits just to resolve the jurisdic-
tional issue.135  Not only is the plaintiff at a disadvantage under the juris-
128. See Himmel & Gottlieb, supra note 106, at 4 (explaining significance of
jurisdictional/substantive distinction).
129. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.
1991) (noting that prejudice against plaintiff would occur if 12(b)(6) motion was
treated as 12(b)(1)).
130. See Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997).  The Third
Circuit stated:
[W]hen there is a factual question about whether a court has juris-
diction, the trial court may examine facts outside the pleadings and thus
“the trial court may proceed as it never could under [Rule] 12(b)(6) or
[Rule] 56.  Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial
court’s jurisdiction—its very power to hear the case. . . .  [N]o presump-
tive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of
disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating
for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”
Id. (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.
1977).
131. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings”,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 954 (2011) (noting danger of conflating legislative and
judicial jurisdiction); see also Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983,
990 (7th Cir. 2000) (“On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court is not
bound to accept the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but may look beyond
the complaint and the pleadings to evidence that calls the court’s jurisdiction into
doubt.”).
132. See Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 988
(2009) (“Courts are told to decide subject-matter jurisdiction questions first in
most cases.  But they must resolve them always and unfailingly, even if last.”).
133. See Himmel & Gottlieb, supra note 106, at 4 (discussing ways in which
12(b)(1) motions favor defendant).
134. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 957 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Wood, J., dissenting) (“[A]n inquiry into whether a particular course
of conduct has a ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on either
the domestic commerce of the United States or its import commerce threatens to
become a preliminary trial on the merits.”).
135. See id. at 944 (majority opinion) (describing procedural posture of case).
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dictional view, but the courts’ and parties’ resources can be tied up for
long periods of time in these trials within trials.136
The decision in Animal Science Products dramatically swings the proce-
dural battle in favor of the plaintiff.137  By interpreting FTAIA as a sub-
stantive merits limitation on the Sherman Act, the Third Circuit’s ruling
strips the defendant of the ability to bring a 12(b)(1) motion on the basis
of FTAIA.138  Instead, a foreign antitrust defendant must now resort to
either a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a Rule
56(c) motion for summary judgment, both of which favor the plaintiff.139
By characterizing FTAIA as a substantive statute, the Third Circuit made it
clear that it would view FTAIA criteria as an element of the plaintiff’s anti-
trust claim.140  Consequently, a motion to dismiss based on FTAIA goes to
the merits of the case and implicates factual questions.141  As long as a
plaintiff can satisfy the pleading standards, the plaintiff can survive a
12(b)(6) motion and the defendant’s hope of resolving a case early essen-
tially evaporates.142
A defendant’s other option under Animal Science Products, a summary
judgment motion, is equally disadvantageous.143  One of the most impor-
tant advantages of a 12(b)(1) motion to a defendant is that it allows a case
136. For a further discussion of the problems of timeliness and drain on judi-
cial resources inherent in the jurisdictional view of FTAIA, see supra notes 134–36
and accompanying text.
137. See Foote & Russell, supra note 99, at 3 (describing potential impact of
Animal Science Products and stating, “[p]rocedural differences in the way that juris-
dictional and substantive limitations are treated can be determinative in the timing
and outcome of a defendant’s challenge based on the FTAIA”).
138. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469
(3d Cir. 2011) (“[The renewed] motions must be decided pursuant to the proce-
dural framework that governs a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursu-
ant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . rather than a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”).
139. See Himmel & Gottlieb, supra note 106, at 4 (noting that “plaintiff has the
upper-hand” in 12(b)(6) and Rule 56(c) motions).
140. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 956 (Wood, J., dissenting) (referring to
debate over FTAIA as “ ‘element’ versus ‘jurisdiction’” debate); see also Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (stating that when statute is substantive, it
acts as element of plaintiff’s claim for relief).
141. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal,
and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 910 (2010) (noting that courts
faced with 12(b)(6) motions should “weigh the remaining facts and determine if
they are sufficient to ‘nudge [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plau-
sible’” (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007))).
142. See Himmel & Gottlieb, supra note 106, at 5 (describing Twombly and
Iqbal standards and what antitrust plaintiffs must plead to withstand motion to
dismiss).
143. See id. at 4 (noting that plaintiff “has the upper-hand” in both 12(b)(6)
and 56(c) motions).
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to be resolved without the need for discovery.144  Under the Third Cir-
cuit’s ruling, if the plaintiff’s claim survives a 12(b)(6) motion, the defen-
dant must expend considerable time and energy in discovery to prove that
no genuine issue of material fact exists.145  Further, unlike a 12(b)(1) mo-
tion, the burden of proof for a summary judgment motion rests with the
defendant as the moving party.146
B. Policy Considerations
The Third Circuit’s shift from a jurisdictional to a substantive view of
FTAIA also carries certain policy considerations.147  The policy arguments
espoused by proponents of the jurisdictional view include issues of timeli-
ness and foreign relations.148  First, because a 12(b)(1) motion allows the
court to dismiss a case at its outset without examining the factual allega-
tions, the jurisdictional view of FTAIA allowed for meritless cases to be
resolved quickly.149  While this is normally the case when it comes to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, FTAIA provides specific standards that a court
must examine before making a decision on the motion.150  Determining
whether to dismiss a Sherman Act case for want of subject matter jurisdic-
tion requires an inquiry into whether the conduct has a “direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” which can take time and become a
drain on judicial resources.151
The second policy matter raised by proponents of the jurisdictional
approach involves the relationship between United States courts and for-
144. See Walsh, supra note 109, at 2–3 (detailing advantages of 12(b)(1) mo-
tion to defendants, noting non-waivability, and fact that it can lead to immediate
dismissal of case at pleadings stage).
145. See Rich et al., supra note 81, at 2 (noting that Animal Science Products will
lead to increased discovery costs thereby enhancing plaintiffs’ settlement
leverage).
146. See Foote & Russell, supra note 99, at 3 (noting that, in summary judg-
ment motion, “plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts in its
favor”).
147. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th
Cir. 2003) (discussing policy considerations that must be made when analyzing
FTAIA); see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462,
467 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing “threshold question” simply as requiring court to
distinguish between two sources of congressional authority).
148. See Valdespino, supra note 4, at 482–83 (describing potential policy
implications).
149. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952 (noting how viewing FTAIA as juris-
dictional leads to timely resolution of cases).
150. For further discussion of the FTAIA exceptions, see supra notes 48–56
and 118–22 and accompanying text.
151. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 957 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting dif-
ference between normal subject matter jurisdiction inquiries and subject matter
jurisdiction inquires for FTAIA).
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eign economics.152  Treating FTAIA as jurisdictional limits the power of
United States courts to meddle in foreign nations’ economic policies.153
By placing this check on the courts, FTAIA streamlines foreign antitrust
litigation and promotes international comity.154
The countervailing policy argument for a substantive approach, how-
ever, points out that if FTAIA strips the federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction, those cases would revert to state courts.155  State courts would
likely vary in the way they approach the cases with some dismissing for
forum non conveniens, some applying the substantive view and dismissing on
the merits, and others simply keeping the case and adjudicating it.156  This
lack of uniformity would lead to problems with foreign nations whose
companies would be unable to predict the consequences of their conduct
within the United States.157  The substantive approach would keep these
suits within the federal system and provide stability to FTAIA litigation and
relations with foreign sovereigns.158
C. Strategies for Practitioners
The decision in Animal Science Products will have important implica-
tions for the way practitioners litigate foreign antitrust cases in the Third
152. See Kenneth R. O’Rourke et al., The FTAIA in State Court: A Defense Perspec-
tive, LAW360 (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.omm.com/files/upload/FTAIAarticle.
pdf (stating that goal of FTAIA is to respect foreign sovereignty).
153. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952 (“FTAIA limits the power of the
United States courts (and private plaintiffs) from nosing about where they do not
belong.”).
154. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (exam-
ining issues of international comity to determine whether exercise of jurisdiction is
proper).
155. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 958 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting that
“state courts can and will hear foreign commerce antitrust cases where ‘direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable’ effects are missing”); see also O’Rourke et
al., supra note 152, at 1 (“As federal courts tighten the reins on private antitrust
actions, some antitrust plaintiffs are focusing their attention on litigating in state
court.  And they are being creative about how to avoid removal to federal court.”).
156. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 958 (Wood, J., dissenting) (discussing
possible state court approaches to dealing with foreign antitrust suits); see also
Schmidt, supra note 49, at 255 (noting that forum non coveniens could be used to
clear up court congestion).
157. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 958 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting fric-
tion that jurisdictional approach could cause with foreign sovereigns); see also Ed-
ward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Claims by Foreign Plaintiffs Under State Law, 26
ANTITRUST 43, 46 (2011) (“The application of state antitrust laws to foreign claims
beyond the bounds set by the FTAIA and Empagran would likely introduce uncer-
tainty and confusion in the law and frustrate the Congressional intent that the
United States speak with one voice on the issue of American jurisdiction over for-
eign commerce.”).
158. See Cavanagh, supra note 157, at 45–46 (noting that state courts would
not be able to adjudicate foreign antitrust suits under substantive view of FTAIA).
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Circuit.159  To begin, foreign defendants can no longer invoke FTAIA in a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.160 Animal Science
Products places FTAIA’s focus squarely on the merits, meaning foreign de-
fendants must strategize ways to attack the plaintiff’s allegations, as op-
posed to simply submitting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion and forcing the
plaintiff to defend against it.161  One strategy for attacking the merits of
the claim would be to show that the plaintiff’s injury was not directly
caused by the anticompetitive conduct’s domestic effect.162  Under the Su-
preme Court’s analysis of the “effects” exception in Empagran, a defendant
can successfully move to dismiss on the merits by showing that the plain-
tiff’s claim is based on allegations of a merely hypothetical conspiracy that
“must have” affected domestic commerce.163
Plaintiffs’ major goal after Animal Science Products is to adequately ad-
dress the elements of FTAIA in their complaint.164  While the Animal Sci-
ence Products decision places the burden on the defendant, it would be
unwise for the plaintiff to think they can simply ignore or gloss-over FTAIA
in their complaint and survive a motion to dismiss.165  Plaintiffs must
avoid generality when describing the effect of the defendant’s conduct on
domestic commerce.166  Merely stating that the effects of the injury were
felt worldwide, including the United States, is likely not enough to survive
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under the Animal Science Products ratio-
nale.167  However, in the wake of Animal Science Products, a foreign anti-
trust claim that is stated with particularity and adequately addresses the
159. For a further discussion of the practical implications for Third Circuit
practitioners, see infra notes 160–168 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of why defendants can no longer move to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.
161. See Himmel & Gottlieb, supra note 106, at 4–5 (discussing ways which
defendants can “break[ ] the chain” in order to win dismissal on merits).
162. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173
(2004) (“Congress would not have intended the FTAIA’s exception to bring inde-
pendently caused foreign injury within the Sherman Act’s reach.”).
163. See Himmel & Gottlieb, supra note 106, at 3–4 (explaining possible re-
sponses that foreign defendants can take to substantive interpretation of FTAIA).
For a further discussion of the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “effects” exception
in Empagran, see supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
164. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 964 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Wood, J., dissenting) (“FTAIA adds an element to an antitrust
claim . . . .”).
165. See Himmel & Gottlieb, supra note 106, at 3–5 (discussing tactics foreign
defendants can use to attack complaints that inadequately address FTAIA).
166. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 471
(3d Cir. 2011) (detailing how district court should assess plaintiffs’ claim and not-
ing what plaintiffs must allege).
167. See id. (“District Court should assess whether the plaintiffs adequately
alleged that the defendants’ conduct is directed at a U.S. import market and not
solely whether the defendants physically imported goods into the United States.”).
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FTAIA exceptions has a very good chance of surviving a motion to dismiss
and making it to trial.168
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Third Circuit’s decision in Animal Science Products devi-
ates from the established view of FTAIA, there is evidence that it is merely
the first step in a complete overhaul of the way the circuits view the stat-
ute.169  For now, foreign antitrust defendants in the Third Circuit will find
it considerably more difficult to secure dismissal at the early pleading
stages.170  Instead, there will likely be more discovery and trials in the
Third Circuit, which will in turn lead to more costs, in both time and
money, for foreign defendants.171  Thus, foreign companies must ex-
amine the implications of the Animal Science Products decision, and con-
sider the likelihood of prolonged antitrust litigation if their conduct falls
within the reach of the Third Circuit.172
168. See Murray & Cook, supra note 122, at 2 (noting that Animal Science
Products “makes it significantly easier for a federal antitrust plaintiff’s Sherman
Act claims against foreign defendants to survive a motion to dismiss under the
FTAIA”); Rich et al., supra note 81, at 2 (“[T]he Third Circuit’s decision makes it
easier for such claims to survive an FTAIA challenge.”).
169. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2011)
(discussing Arbaugh and also stating “United Phosphorus may be ripe for reconsidera-
tion, but we need not undertake that task here.  Whether it blocks jurisdiction or
establishes an element of a Sherman Act claim, the FTAIA applies here to bar this
antitrust suit.”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 2, 2011).
170. For a discussion of the burden shifting between 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
motions, see supra notes 126–46 and accompanying text.
171. See Foote & Russell, supra note 99, at 3 (discussing trend set by Third
Circuit and its potential effects on foreign defendants); Himmel & Gottlieb, supra
note 106, at 4–5 (explaining potential effects of substantive view on foreign de-
fendants and suggesting litigation strategies).
172. See Murray & Cook, supra note 122, at 2 (noting impact of relaxed juris-
dictional protections on foreign import and export companies).
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